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NOTE 
THE SEC AND THE EXTENT OF ITS 
POWER TO SANCTION: AN 
ANALYSIS OF TEICHER v. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION - DID THE COURT 
CORRECTLY APPLY CHEVRON v. 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 
COUNCIL TO A MATTER OF 
AGENCY INTERPRETATION? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 1, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in 
part a May 20, 1998 final order by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), barring petitioners Vic-
tor Teicher ("Teicher") and Ross S. Frankel ("Frankel") from 
associating with any registered or unregistered investment 
adviser.) The court imposed these sanctions as a result of 
Teicher's and Frankel's criminal convictions for participating 
1 
See Teicher v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 
1999). Victor Teicher & Co. was also convicted and barred along with the individual 
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in an insider trading scheme in the late 1980'S.2 The bar 
against Teicher, who was at all relevant times associated with 
an unregistered investment adviser,3 was entered pursuant to 
Section 203(0 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (" Advis-
ers Act").4 The same bar against Frankel, who was at all rele-
vant times associated with a broker-dealer,' was entered pur-
suant to Section 15(b)(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 ("Exchange Act").6 
2 See Brief of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Respondent at 2, Teicher 
v. S.E.C., 177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 98·1287, Consolidated with 98-1414) 
[hereinafter Respondent's Brief]. See also infra notes 124-140 and accompanying text. 
S An unregistered investment adviser is an investment adviser who is not regis-
tered with the SEC. See generally K. FRED SKOUSEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SEC 
37 (4th ed. 1987). 
4 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3<O (1994). See also Respondent's Brief at 3. The relevant por-
tion of 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3<O states: 
The Commission, by order, shall censure or place limitations on the 
activities of any person associated, seeking to become associated with 
an investment adviser, or suspend for a period not exceeding twelve 
months or bar any such person from being associated with an invest-
ment adviser, if the Commission finds ... that such censure, placing of 
limitations, suspen'sion, or bar is in the public interest and that such 
person [has been convicted of securities fraud or enjoined against con-
duct in violation of the securities laws]. 
[d. at 4. See also Brief of Petitioners Victor Teicher and Victor Teicher & Company, 
L.P. at 8, n. 3, Teicher v. S.E.C., 177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 98-1287, Consoli-
dated with 98-1414) [hereinafter Petitioners' Brief]. Concluding that Teicher & Co. 
was simply Mr. Teicher's alter ego, the SEC determined that it did not have to address 
the issues raised with respect to Teicher & Co. under Section 203(e), which deals with 
the Commission's jurisdiction over registered investment advisers rather than persons 
associated with such advisers. See id. 
6 Whether or not a broker-dealer is registered with the SEC is not an issue with 
respect to Frankel's case. See Memorandum of Law of Petitioner Ross S. Frankel, 
Teicher v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 
98-1297, Consolidated with 98-1414) [hereinafter Petitioner's Memo]. 
6 15 U.S.C. § 780(bX6) (1994). See also Respondent's Brief at 4. The relevant por-
tion of15 U.S.C. § 780(bX6) states: 
With respect to any person who is associated, who is seeking to be-
come associated, or, at the time of the alleged misconduct, who was as-
sociated or was seeking to become associated with a broker or dealer, . 
. . the Commission, by order, shall censure, place limitations on the ac-
tivities or functions of such person, or suspend for a period not ex-
ceeding 12 months, or bar such person from being associated with a 
broker or dealer, ... if the Commission finds ... that such censure, 
placing of limitations, suspension, or bar is in the public interest and 
that such person [had been convicted of securities fraud or enjoined 
against conduct in violation of the securities laws]. [d. 
2
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This note will address two primary issues in analyzing 
Teicher. The first is whether the SEC has the authority within 
its sanctioning power, specifically under Section 15(b)(6) of the 
Exchange Act, to impose collateral limitations on a person who 
violates the Exchange Act, such as preventing that person from 
utilizing his or her license in another branch of the securities 
industry. The second is whether the SEC has the authority 
within its sanctioning power, specifically under Section 203(0 
of the Advisers Act, to bar a person who violates the Adviser's 
Act from associating or seeking to become associated with an 
unregistered investment adviser. 
To place these two issues in context, this note will first dis-
cuss the SEC and its sanctioning authority within federal se-
curities law enforcement. Second, this note will discuss the 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel7 
deference standard that courts must use in reviewing agencies' 
statutory interpretations when administering sanctions. Fi-
nally, this note will present the facts, procedural history and 
court's analysis of Teicher, and will conclude with a critique of 
the court's determination deferring to the SEC's interpretation 
of Section 203(0 of the Advisers Act, but overruling the SEC's 
interpretation of Section 15(b)( 6) of the Exchange Act. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND ITS . 
STATUTORY POWER TO SANCTION 
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, continual 
widespread abuses in the securities markets led many con-
cerned investors to seek federal securities legislation to pro-
vide investor protection.8 Such abuses included price manipu-
lation, the excessive use of credit to finance speculative activi-
ties, and the misuse of corporate information by corporate offi-
7 467 u.s. 837 (1984). 
8 
See SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
3
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cials.9 Accordingly, the birth of securities regulation in the 
United States ("U.S.") did not result solely from the stock mar-
ket crash in 1929 or the ensuing years of financial stagnation 
as the popular misconception holds.1O Nevertheless, in an ef-
fort to limit these abuses and advance honest and open securi-
ties markets, Congress created the SEC. II 
The SEC is an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial 
regulatory agency of the U.S. government. 12 It is directed by 
five commissioners, each of whom is appointed by the U.S. 
President with approval of the Senate. 13 One commissioner sits 
as Chairman. 14 The SEC is administered from its Washington, 
D.C. headquarters, but has regional and district branch offices 
in the major financial centers of the U.S. IS The Commission 
carries out its work primarily through its staff, which is or-
ganized into divisions and offices each with specific areas of 
responsibility. 16 The Division of Enforcement is one such divi-
9 . 
See id at 4. 
10 S id ee at3. 
11 
See id. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 authorized the creation of the 
SEC on June 6, 1934. See id. at 23. 
12 
See OFFICE OF PuBLIC AFFAIRS, POLICY EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. 
SECURITIES AND ExCHANGE COMMISSION, THE WORK OF THE SEC 5 (1997) [hereinafter 
WORK OF THE SEC]. 
IS • • 
See SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 9. No more than three of the COmmISSioners can 
be from the same political party and each commissioner is appointed for a five-year 
term with one member's term expiring on June 5 of each year. See id. 
14 See id. The Chairman is designated solely by the U.S. President. See id. 
16 OSee SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 11. Regional office locations include: Atlanta, 
Boston, Chicago, Denver, Fort Worth, Los Angeles, New York, Seattle and Washing-
ton. District Branch office locations include: Cleveland, Detroit, Houston, Miami, 
Philadelphia, Salt Lake City, San Francisco and St. Louis. See id. 
16 See WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 12, at 27. Divisions serving under the Com-
mission include: Division of Corporate Finance, Division of Market Regulation, Divi-
sion of Investment Management and Division of Enforcement. Mlijor offices serving 
under the Commission include: the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Compliance 
Inspections and Examinations, the Office of Municipal Securities, and the Office of 
Investor Education and Assistance. See id. 
4
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sion, and is responsible for the review and direction of all en-
forcement activities. 17 
1. Governing Legislation 
Congress provided the SEC with broad powers to regulate 
securities and their markets through a series of primaryl8 and 
secondaryl9 Acts.20 Of concern to this note is one primary act, 
the Exchange Act21 and one secondary act, the Advisers Act.22 
Both Acts are defined and discussed below. 
a. The Exchange Act 
In 1934, Congress enacted the Exchange Act to regulate the 
trading of securities on secondary markets through brokers, 
17 
See SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 13. 
~. . 
See id. at 19. Primary Acts were those first created to address the apparent 
market abuses at the time. There are two primary Acts. The other primary Act is the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1933). See id. "The purpose of this Act is to 
regulate the initial offering and actual sale of securities through the mail system (in-
terstate commerce)." Id. 
19 See id. at 27. Secondary Acts arose though time to address issues subsequent to 
those that the Securities, and Exchange Acts first sought to remedy. Secondary Acts, 
in addition to the Advisers Act include: the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935, 15 U.S.C. §79 (1935); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 53 Stat 1149 
(1939)(amending scattered sections of Title 15 of the U.S. Code); the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1940); the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 
15 U.S.C. § 78aaa (1970); the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd 
(1977); and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98-376, 98 Stat 1264 
(1984)(amending scattered sections of Title 15 of the U.S. Code). See id. 
20 
See SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 18. 
21 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994). See also The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: 
What It Is, What It Does, en 3 (visited Nov. 4, 1999) 
<http://www.sec.gov/asec/asecart.htmi>.This Act prohibits companies, securities 
brokerage firms and others from engaging in fraudulent and unfair behavior, for ex-
ample insider trading. "Rules concerning the operation of the markets and partici-
pants, including proxy solicitations by companies and shareholders, tender offers and 
buying securities on credit (margin), are also part of this Act." Id. 
22 
See id. at en 5. Under this Act, the law establishes a pattern of regulating in-
vestment advisers. In some respects, it has provisions similar to the Exchange Act 
that governs the conduct of securities broker-dealers. "With certain exceptions, this 
Act requires that persons or firms compensated for advising others about securities 
investments must register with the Commission and conform to statutory standards 
designed to protect investors." Id. See also SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 23,29. 
5
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dealers and exchanges as well as to eliminate abuses in the 
trading of securities after their initial distribution.23 The Ex-
change Act is comprised of many different sections.24 Of par-
ticular importance to this note are parts (a) and (b) of Section 
15. Part (a) requires broker-dealers to register with the SEC, 
but allows the Commission to provide exemptions from regis-
tration.25 Part (b) authorizes the Commission to discipline bro-
ker-dealers.26 For example, Section 15(b)(4)27 authorizes the 
Commission to deny, revoke or suspend the registration of any 
broker-dealer firm. These sanctions can only be imposed for 
specific acts committed by the broker-dealer itself or those as-
sociated with it, and only where it is in the public's interest.28 
Congress amended the Exchange Act in 1964 to permit the 
lesser sanctions of censure and suspension of registration29 and 
to add Section 15(b)(6),JO authorizing the Commission to impose 
sanctions on individual brokers or dealers, not just the broker-
dealer firms.3) Grounds for imposing such sanctions included 
violations of not only the Exchange Act, but also the Advisers 
Act and other statutes administered by the Commission.32 
23 See id. at 23. In addition to the abuses mentioned supra, other abuses in the 
trading of securities may include: "wash sales and matched orders (in which buy and 
sell orders are made in rapid succession in order to give the impression of active trad-
ing), induced trading by false statements, misuse of pro forma financial statements, 
and certain other practices such price stabilization and short sales." [d. at 25. 
24 
15 U.S.C. § 78a (1994). 
25 See Respondent's Brief at 15-16. 
26 
See id. at 16. 
27 Section 15(bX4) of the Exchange Act was designated Section 15(bX5) prior to 
1964 amendments. See id. 
28 See id. 
29 See Respondent's Brief at 16. 
30 Section 15(bX6) of the Exchange Act was then designated Section 15(bX7). See 
id. 
31 See id. Section 15(bX6) allows the Commission to .. 'censure any person, or bar 
or suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months any person from being associated 
with a broker-dealer' if the person engaged in certain conduct and if it is in the public 
interest to impose the sanction." Id. 
32 
See Respondent's Brief at 17. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/6
2000] SECURITIES LAW 599 
In 1975, Congress narrowed the class of persons against 
whom proceedings under Section 15(b)(6) could be brought by 
changing "any person" to "any persons associated with a broker 
or dealer."J3 Thus, not only could the SEC sanction broker-
dealer firms and individual brokers and dealers, but also those 
persons associated with each. "At the same time, Congress 
expanded the sanctions contained in Sections 15(b)(4) and (6) 
to provide that the Commission could 'place limitations on the 
activities' of the broker-dealer firms and their associated per-
sons. "34 
b. The Advisers Act 
In 1940, Congress enacted the Advisers Act to regulate in-
vestment advisers.3S One most notable reason for the enact-
ment was to prohibit fraudulent conduct, such as violations of 
the fiduciary duties that investment advisers owe to their cli-
ents.36 To this end, Section 203(a) of the Act, requires persons, 
or firms that are compensated for providing security invest-
ment advice to register with the SEC37 unless they are exempt 
from registration under 203(b)38 or prohibited from registration 
83 ld. 
34 ld. 
S5 See WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 12, at 24. This Act also regulates advisers to 
investment companies, private money managers, and most financial planners. See id. 
36 See id. 
37 
See id. 
38 To qualify for a Section 203(b) exemption from registration an investment ad-
viser must be: 
(1) any investment adviser all of whose clients are residents of the State 
within which such investment advisor maintains his or its principal office and 
place of business, and who does not furnish advice or issue analyses or reports 
with respect to securities listed or admitted to unlisted trading privileges on 
any national securities exchange; (2) any investment adviser whose only cli-
ents are insurance companies; or (3) any investment adviser who during the 
course of the preceding twelve months has had fewer than fifteen clients and 
who neither holds himself out generally to the public as an investment ad-
viser nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company registered 
under Title 1 of this Act, or a company which has elected to be a business de-
velopment company pursuant to Section 54 of Title 1 of this Act and has not 
withdrawn its election. 
Petitioners' Briefat 12-13. 
7
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under Section 203A. 39 This Act also requires persons or firms 
to comply with statutory requirements, which are designed to 
protect their clients.40 Such requirements mandate "proper 
and complete" disclosure of information about investment ad-
visers including their backgrounds, business affiliations, and 
grounds for compensation.41 When any of these requirements 
are violated, Sections 203(e) and (f) authorize the Commission 
to discipline the investment advisers and their associated per-
sons.42 
Ai:; originally enacted in 1940, Section 203(e) of the Advisers 
Act43 authorized the Commission to deny, revoke or suspend an 
applicant, if the applicant, whether an investment adviser firm 
or persons associated with one, committed certain acts, in-
cluding any violation of the Exchange Act.44 Such denial, revo-
cation, or suspension, however, must be made in the public's 
interest.45 In 1970, Congress amended this section to include 
the sanction of censure.46 Congress also added Section 203(£)4' 
to parallel the amendments made in 1964 to Section 15(b) of 
the Exchange Act.48 Thus, like Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange 
Act, Section 203(f) allowed the Commission to impose sanc-
tions on individuals associated with an investment adviser, in 
39 See Respondent's Brief at 17-1B. Section 203A of the Advisers Act disallows 
registration with the Commission of any investment adviser that has less than $25 
million under management. See id. at 1B n.1B. 
40 S id ee . 
41 
See SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 3l. 
42 See Respondent's Brief at lB. 
43 Section 203(e) of the Advisers Act was then designated Section 203(d). See id. at 
1B-19. 
« ' 
This also includes any violation of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"). 
See id. at 19. 
45 • 
See Respondent's Bnef at 19. 
46 
See id. 
47 See id. at 19. Section 203(0 of the Advisers Act allows "the Commission to 'cen-
sure any person or bar or suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months any per-
son from being associated with an investment adviser' if the person engaged in certain 
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addition to sanctioning the investment adviser, whether a per-
son or firm.49 
In 1975, Congress made additional changes to Sections 
203(e) and (f) of the Advisers Act.so Like the changes made to 
Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, "Congress narrowed the 
class of persons against whom proceedings under Section 
203(f) could be brought by changing 'any person' to 'any per-
sons associated [with] or seeking to become associated with an 
investment adviser.' "31 Thus, the SEC could sanction only 
those persons associated with both investment adviser firms 
and individual investment advisers. Congress also expanded 
the sanctions provided in Sections 203( e) and (f) to provide 
that the Commission could "place limitations on the activities" 
of advisers and their associated persons.32 Finally, Congress 
changed Section 203(e) to provide that the SEC could impose 
sanctions on "any" investment adviser rather than on "an" in-
vestment adviser.33 
2. Sanctioning Powers under The Exchange and Advisers Acts 
Through the Exchange and Advisers Acts, the SEC uses its 
statutory powers granted to it by Congress to impose remedies 
in its administrative, quasi-judicial capacity.34 For example, 
provisions in the Exchange and Advisers Acts authorize the 
Commission's Division of Enforcement ("Division") to institute 
administrative proceedings and impose sanctions against per-
sons associated with broker-dealers, municipal securities deal-
ers, investment advisers, or investment companies.33 The ap-
49 • 
See Respondent's Bnef at 19-20. 
50 See id. at 20. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See Respondent's Brief at 20. The section change from "an" to "any" investment 
adviser is used by the Commission to support its argument that unregistered invest-
ment advisers are within its sanctioning jurisdiction. See id. at 29. 
54 
See SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at l. 
55 See Phillip D. Parker, Administrative Orders Barring Individuals From Associ-
ating With Entities in the Securities Industry, 561 PLIICorp 1008, 1011 (1987) [herein-
after Parker, Administrative Orders]. 
9
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plication of these Acts' remedial measures, however, depends 
upon the interpretation of their respective sanctioning provi-
sions and the context of the situation in which they are ap-
plied. 56 Thus, the appropriateness of an administrative sanc-
tion depends primarily on the facts of each case.S7 
Mindful of its statutory authority to ensure investor protec-
tion, the SEC, primarily through its Division, typically begins 
each case by investigating complaints and other indicators of 
possible securities transaction violations.s8 The Commission 
then evaluates the information obtained by such an investiga-
tion to determine whether evidence of a violation exists, 
whether further investigation is necessary, and whether it 
should impose sanctions.s9 When the facts show possible fraud 
or other similar violations, the Commission may, in addition to 
pursuing an administrative remedy, pursue a civil action in a 
U.S. District COurt/oI) 
In the case of an administrative proceeding, the Commis-
sion typically issues an order specifying the illegal acts or prac-
tices allegedly committed and then directs that a hearing, be-
fore an administrative law judge (" ALJ"), be held for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence.61 At this hearing, the counsel for 
66 
See generally Respondent's Brief. 
67 
See Arnold S. Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5, SECLITPRAC § 
261.05 (1997-1999 West Group) [hereinafter Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under 
Rule lOb-5]. The Commission has eight choices when it discovers a violation by a 
broker-dealer or investment adviser, by a person who is associated with them, or by a 
person who is seeking to become so associated: It can (1) convince the Department of 
Justice to institute a criminal action; (2) commence a court proceeding seeking to 
eI\ioin further violations; (3) discipline the broker, dealer, or person administratively 
at that time; (4) discipline him in an administrative proceeding after he has been con-
victed or eI\ioined; (5) issue an order to comply with Section 12, 13, 14, or 15(d) of the 
Exchange Act; (6) issue a permanent or temporary cease-and-desist order; (7) assess a 
civil monetary penalty; or (8) order an accounting and disgorgement. See id. 
68 
See WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 12, at 33. 
59 S id ee . at 34. 
60 
See id. In a "civil action, the Commission may apply to a U.S. District Court for 
an order prohibiting the acts or practices alleged to violate the law or Commissions 
rules, or request court ordered remedies such as disgorgement or civil money penal-
ties." Id. 
61 
See id. at 35. 
10
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the Division presents those facts supporting the charge.62 Re-
spondents then have an opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses and to defend with their own evidence.63 If the ALJ 
finds that the respondents have violated the law, it may im-
pose statutory sanctions as discussed above.64 
The ALJ's decision may be appealed directly to the five 
Commissioners,65 which have the power to change the 
sanction.66 If the Commission does so to the detriment of the 
respondent, the respondent may bring his or her case before an 
appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals.67 The appellate court, how-
ever, may grant relief only if the Commission's findings of fact 
are not supported by substantial evidence or if the imposed 
sanctions are an abuse of the Commission's discretion.68 
The two provisions at issue in this note, which authorize 
the Division to institute administrative proceedings and to im-
pose sanctions, are Sections 15(b)(6)69 of the Exchange Act ann 
203(070 of the Advisers Act. 
a. Sanctioning Under Section 15(b)(6) of The Exchange Act and 
The "Collateral Bar" Issue 
Section 15(b)(6)71 permits the Commission, after giving no-
tice and an opportunity for a hearing before an ALJ, to censure 
62 
See WORK OF THE SEC, supra note 12, at 35. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 
See Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5, supra note 57. 
66 See id. See also Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1102 (D.C. Cir. 
1988). 
67 
See Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb·5, supra note 57. 
68 See id. (citing Kane v. SEC, 842 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1998». 
69 15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(6). The SEC uses Section 15(b)(6) to sanction a person associ-
ated or seeking to become associated with a broker or dealer. See id. 
70 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(O. The SEC uses Section 203(0 to sanction a person associated 
or seeking to become associated with investment advisers. See id. 
71 
15 U.S.C. § 780(b)(6). This section of the Exchange Act provides: 
The Commission, by order shall censure or place limitations on the 
activities or functions of any person associated, or seeking to become 
11
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a respondent, place limitations on his activities, suspend him 
for up to one year, or bar him from associating72 with a broker-
dealer, even after he has already been permanently or tempo-
rarily enjoined from further violating federal securities laws.73 
Of these options, a bar order and a place limitations order are 
the most comprehensive. While a bar order precludes associa-
tion with all brokers-dealers, whether or not they are required 
to register with the Commission under Section 15(a) of the Ex-
change Act,74 the phrase "place limitations on the activities or 
functions of any person associated, or seeking to become asso-
ciated with a broker-dealer" is construed by the Commission to 
allow it to bar Exchange Act violators, or those associated with 
Exchange Act violators, indefinitely from the securities indus-
try as a whole. 
Between 1996 and 1999, in administrative litigation the 
SEC has sought these suspensions and "collateral bars" with 
greater frequency using Section 15(b)(6) as its weapon.7' This 
has been met, however, without much success.76 The SEC im-
poses a collateral bar or suspension when it sanctions someone 
under one of the federal securities acts, such as the Exchange 
Act, but suspends or bars that person from associating with 
professionals governed by other acts, such as the Advisers 
associated with a broker-dealer, or suspend for a period not exceeding 
twelve months or bar any such person from being associated with a 
broker-dealer, if the Commission finds, on the record after notice and 
opportunity for hearing, that such censure, placing of limitations, sus-
pension, or bar is in the public interest and that such person ... has 
been convicted of certain specified offenses. [d. 
72 See Respondent's Brief. The Commission interprets the "associated or seeking 
to become associated" language of Section 15(b)(6) to require such actual and antici-
pated association either at the time the administrative proceedings are instituted or at 
the time the alleged misconduct occurred. Thus, a person cannot evade the Commis-
sion's administrative jurisdiction by severing his association with a regulated entity 
prior to the institution of administrative proceedings. See id. 
73 
See Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Unckr Rule lOb-5, supra note 57. ,. 
See id. 
75 See In the Matter of Meyer Blinder, 65 S.E.C 1378, 1389 (1997) (see Commis-
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Act.n Many ALJs have refused to impose such collateral bars, 
most notably because they perceive that the SEC lacks the 
statutory authority to impose them.78 
One such administrative proceeding in which an ALJ de-
nied the Commission's request for a collateral bar was in In re 
James Robert Voigtsberger, and Peter Chase Advisors, Inc. 79 In 
this case, the Division brought a proceeding under both the 
Exchange and Advisers Acts following Voigtsberger's convic-
tion on charges that he had engaged in a twelve-year scheme 
to defraud his clients.80 The ALJ barred Voigtsberger from as-
sociating with any broker-dealer or investment adviser, but 
refused to bar him from associating with any investment com-
pany or municipal securities dealer as the Division requested.81 
Similarly, in In re Martin B. Sloate,82 an ALJ prohibited 
Sloate, who had consented to a federal court injunction for in-
sider trading, from associating with broker-dealers with a 
right to reapply in one year.83 The ALJ, however, refused the 
Division's request to impose a collateral bar prohibiting Sloate 
from associating with investment advisers or investment com-
panies.84 
Even more recently, in In re James A Sehn and Samuel O. 
Forson,85 an ALJ held that the industry-wide bar sought by the 
Commission against Forson was beyond the authority of Sec-
77 See Inside the SEC, 11 No. 12 Insights 33 (Dec. 1997) [hereinafter Inside the 
SEC]. 
7S S id ee . 
79 See Harvey L. Pitt, SEC Suspensions and Bars: ·On a Clear Day, You Can See 
Forever; 908 PLIICorp 263, 265 (1995) (citing Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8476, Initial 
Decision ReI. No. 64 (May 3, 1995» [hereinafter Pitt, SEC Suspensions and Bars]. 
80 See id 
SI S id ee . 
S2 
See id. (citing Admin. Proc. File No. 3-8232, Initial Decision ReI. No. 50 (June 6, 
1994». 
83 See id. 
84 See Pitt, SEC Suspensions and Bars, supra note 79, at 265. 
85 
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tion 15(b) of the Exchange Act.86 The ALJ, instead, only barred 
Forson from associating with broker-dealers despite finding 
that Forson's conduct evidenced a degree of scienter "close to 
malice" and that Forson would likely continue to work in the 
securities industry after his prison term.87 
Despite these administrative decisions, the Commission 
firmly pronounced its authority to impose "collateral bars" in 
In the Matter of Meyer Blinder. 88 In this case, Blinder was the 
president of Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc. ("Blinder Robinson"), 
a broker-dealer formerly registered with the SEC pursuant to 
Section 15(a) of the Exchange Act. 89 In Blinder's criminal pro-
ceeding, the court convicted him of violating the prospectus 
delivery and antifraud requirements of both the federal securi-
ties laws and the federal anti-racketeering laws.90 He was 
later permanently enjoined from violations and aiding and 
abetting violations of the antifraud, anti-manipulation, and 
recordkeeping provisions of the federal securities laws.91 In 
Blinder's subsequent administrative proceeding, the central 
issue was whether, under the authority of Section 15(b)(6), the 
Division had the power to seek a remedy extending beyond the 
broker-dealer industry.92 The ALJ found that it could not and 
declined to bar Blinder from activities other than those associ-
ated with broker-dealers.93 The Division appealed to the Com-
mission who ultimately found that the "place limitations" lan-
86 See id. Citation8 were specifically to Sections 15(b) and 19(h) of the Exchange 
Act. See id. 
87 See Pitt, SEC Suspensions and Bars, supra note 79, at 265 (citing Admin. Proc. 
File No. 308234, Initial Decision No. 99, 1996 (November 4, 1996». See also Blinder, 
65 S.E.C. at 1389 (see Commissioner Hunt's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
88 
65 S.E.C. 1387. 
89 S id ee . 




See Annual Review of Federal Securities Regulation, Business Lawyer, 53 Bus 
LAw 871, 929 (1998) [hereinafter Annual Review]. 
93 
See Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1389. 
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guage contained within Section 15(b)(6) was sufficiently broad 
to allow for the collateral bar.94 
In determining that the statutory language of Section 
15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act allowed for a collateral bar, the 
Commission analogized to United States v. O'Hagan.9s In 
O'Hagan, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a theory of misap-
propriation with respect to an insider trading scheme after 
expressing its view that "securities laws should be interpreted 
broadly in a manner that is consistent with the statutory lan-
guage and furthers the purpose of the statute."'J6 Accordingly, 
the Court found that it would have made "scant sense" to hold 
O'Hagan liable only if he had misappropriated nonpublic in-
formation from a target, but not from a bidder.97 Similarly, the 
Commission in Blinder reasoned that it would make "scant 
sense" to exclude Blinder from one portion of the securities in-
dustry but not from others.98 Even if the statute did not ex-
plicitly confer such authority, the SEC reasoned that its power 
to bar Blinder's entry into another area of the securities indus-
try99 gave it the power to collaterally bar his entry into those 
other areas prospectively.loo 
Although the SEC announced its seemingly broad collateral 
bar authority, it also set a standard to limit its power. It noted 
that such bars would be justified only in cases in which "it 
[would be] contrary to the public interest to allow someone to 
serve in [a harmful] capacity in the securities industry. "101 For 
94 See Annual Review, supra note 92, at 930. 
~ . 
117 s. Ct. 2199 (1997). See also Annual Review, supra note 92, at 930. 
~ [d. See also Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1379, 1382. 
97 See ill. In other words, the O'Hagan court observed that it made "scant sense" to 
suggest that O'Hagan should be liable only if he had misappropriated nonpublic in-
formation from the target but not the bidder. The court concluded, "the test of [Sec-
tion 10(b)] required no such result." Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1382. 
98 See Annual Review, supra note 92, at 930. 
99 For example, the SEC may bar Blinder's application for registration as an in-
vestment adviser. See id. 
100 S id ee . 
101 S id ee . 
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example, any conduct which " 'flows across' various securities 
professions and poses a risk of harm to the investing public in 
any such profession" would qualify for a collateral bar.l02 
Moreover, in making its determination, the Commission held 
that it would consider the egregiousness of the defendant's 
conduct in imposing such a broad ban.103 In regard to Blinder, 
the SEC reviewed his conduct, which included making threats 
and maintaining a "hit list" of enemies, and determined that it 
was sufficiently egregious and in the public's interest to bar 
him from associating with all other securities industries. 104 
Thus, in Blinder, the SEC had spoken its final word on the 
collateral bar issue. I~ It declared that it had the power to im-
pose collateral bars and sanctions on individuals, even where 
the individuals were found to have violated only one act of the 
federal securities laws. 106 
b. Sanctioning Under Section 203(0 of The Advisers Act 
Similar to Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, Section 
203(0107 of the Advisers Act permits the Commission, after 
giving notice to a respondent and providing him with the op-
portunity for a hearing before an ALJ, to censure him, to place 
limitations on his activities, to suspend him for up to one year, 
or to bar him from being associated with an investment ad-
102 S id ee . 
103 See Annual Review, supra note 92, at 930. 
104 See id. Other industries include those dealing with broker-dealers, municipal 
securities dealers, investment advisers, investment companies, or members of a na-
tional securities exchange or registered securities association. See id. 
105 
See id. 
lOS See Insick the SEC, supra note 77, at 33. 
107. • . 
Section 203(0 of the AdVlsers Act proVldes: 
The Commission, by order, shall censure or place limitations on the 
activities of any person associated, seeking to become associated, or, at 
the time of the alleged misconduct, associated or seeking to become as-
sociated with an investment adviser, or suspend for a period not ex-
ceeding twelve months or bar any such person from being associated 
with an investment adviser if ... [the Commission finds, on the record 
after notice and opportunity for hearing, that such censure, placing of 
limitations, suspension, or bar is in the public interest and that such 
person . . . has been convicted of certain specified offenses.] Respon-
dent's Brief at 4. 
16
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2000], Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss3/6
2000] SECURITIES LAW 609 
viser, even after he has already been permanently or tempo-
rarily enjoined from further violating federal securities laws. 108 
However, whether a bar order precludes association with all 
investment advisers, registered or not, is an unresolved issue 
that is crucial to this note. Nevertheless, Sections 203(e) and 
(£) of the Advisers Act does allow the Commission to discipline 
an investment adviser on the same grounds as Sections 
15(b)(4) and (6) permit the Commission to sanction a broker-
dealer. 109 
B. CHEVRON DEFERENCE: THE SEC's ROLE IN INTERPRETING 
THE SANCTIONING LANGUAGE OF SECTIONS 15(B)(6) OF THE 
EXCHANGE ACT AND 203(F) OF THE ADVISERS ACT 
In general, the Commission must administer the federal se-
curities laws under the direction and intent of Congress. llo 
Congress' discretion, however, can sometimes be ambiguous, 
forcing the Commission to make their own determinations re-
garding Congress' intent. II I These determinations, particularly 
those used to impose sanctions, are often challenged. When 
this occurs, courts must follow the standard set forth in Chev-
ron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council ll2 to 
evaluate the validity of the challenged interpretation. I 13 
In Chevron, environmental groups filed a lawsuit challeng-
ing the Environmental Protection Agency's ("the EPA") Clean 
Air Act regulations that allow states to treat all of the pollu-
tion-emitting devices within the same industrial grouping as 
though they were encased in a single "bubble."114 Under the 
108 
See Jacobs, Litigation and Practice Under Rule lOb-5, supra note 57. 
109 S ·d ee, . 
110 
See SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 6. 
111 S id ee . 
112 
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
113 See id. at 837-38. 
114 . .. 
See id. at 837. The EPA promulgated these regulations pursuant to SectlOn 
172(bX6) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. This section requires states, 
which have not achieved national air quality standards, to establish a permit program 
17
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bubble concept, an existing plant that contains several pollu-
tion-emitting devices may install or modify one piece of equip-
ment without meeting permit conditions if the alteration will 
not increase the total emissions from the plant. I 15 After a dis-
trict court and appellate court ruling against the regulations, 
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. 1I6 In a unanimous opinion, 
the Court set forth a method for analyzing challenges made to 
an agency's decision. 1I7 First, when a court reviews an agency's 
construction of a statute where congressional intent is clear, 
the agency must follow that intent. liS However, if congres-
sional intent is ambiguous or if Congress is silent on the issue, 
a court must give substantial deference to the agency's inter-
pretation to the extent that it is a reasonable construction of 
the statute and fills in any gaps left by Congress. 1I9 
Turning to the EPA's bubble regulations and the underlying 
Section 172(b)(6) of the Clean Air Act, the Court found that 
Congress was silent on the applicability of the bubble concept 
to the term "stationary source."I20 Given this ambiguity, the 
Court found the EPA to have been reasonable in defining "sta-
tionary source."121 The Court also found that the EPA's inter-
pretation represented a reasonable accommodation of mani-
festly competing interests and was entitled to deference. l22 
This same deference standard was applied in Teicher v. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission l2J to determine whether the 
Commission's interpretations of Sections 15(b)(6) of the Ex-
change Act and 203(f) of the Advisers Act were reasonable and 
filled in any gaps within the meaning of Chevron. 
to regulate new or modified mlljor stationary sources of air pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 
7502(b)(6). See also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837. 
115 S id ee . 
116 
See id. at 882. 
117 
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837-38. 
118 
See id. at 842-43. 
119 S id ee . 
120 . 




See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 838. 
123 
177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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III. FACTS 
Beginning in 1985, Teicher was employed as a registered 
representative with Edward A. Viner & Co., a broker-dealer 
registered with the Commission under the Exchange Act. '24 In 
January 1986, while still associated with Viner & Co., Teicher 
formed Victor Teicher & Co., L.P.12S Teicher & Co. invested in 
securities and, for compensation, advised others regarding 
similar investments. 126 The act of advising others for money 
made Teicher & Co. an "investment adviser," as defined in Sec-
tion 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Actl27 and made Teicher a "per-
son associated with an investment adviser" as defined in Sec-
tion 202(a)(17) of the Advisers Act. '28 Teicher & Co., however, 
did not register with the Commission under the Advisers Act, 
claiming it was exempt from registration under Section 
203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act. '29 
From December 1985 until March 1986, Teicher received 
confidential information about possible corporate takeovers 
from Michael David ("David"), an associate with the law firm 
of Paul, Weiss, Riftkind, Warton & Garrison ("Paul Weiss").I30 
Teicher also received confidential information from Robert 
Salsbury ("Salsbury"), a research analyst in the domestic arbi-
trage department of Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. 
124 
See Respondent's Brief at 7. 
125 . . 
See id. Teicher, the sole general partner, was a seventy five percent owner of 
this limited partnership. See id. 
126 S id ee . 
127 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). See also Respondent's Brief at 25. Section 202(a)(11) 
defines "investment adviser" to mean "any person who, for compensation, engages in 
the business of advising others ... as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or 
selling securities." 1d. 
128 . • 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(17). See also Respondent's Bnef at 7. Section 202(a)(17) 
states "a person associated with an investment adviser" is defined as "any partner, 
officer, or director of such investment adviser (or any person performing similar func-
tions), or any person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by such investment 
adviser, including any employee of such investment adviser." 1d. at 25. 
129 
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b). See also Respondent's Brief at 8, 17-18. Section 
203(b)(3) sets out an exemption from registration under the Advisers Act for advisers 
with less than fifteen clients. See id. 
130 
See id. at 8. 
19
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("Drexel"). 131 While Salsbury provided Teicher with the confi-
dential names of companies that were subject to mergers or 
takeovers by Drexel clients, David provided both Teicher and 
Salsbury with information he learned concerning possible ac-
quisitions by Paul Weiss clients.132 With this material, non-
public information, Teicher, from January through March 
1986, purchased and sold the securities of a number of these 
acquisition candidates knowing that the information had been 
misappropriated. 133 
During this same period, Drexel, a registered broker-dealer, 
employed Frankel as the vice president in charge of the re-
search department. l34 Frankel was, therefore, a "person asso-
ciated with a broker-dealer," as defined in Section 3(a)(18) of 
the Exchange Act. 13' Frankel was also Salsbury's supervisor, 
thus when Salsbury received information from David, he 
passed it on to Frankel. l36 Frankel would then either purchase 
or sell the securities of the acquisition candidates. 137 Like 
Teicher, Frankel did so knowing he was using material, non-
public information that had been misappropriated. 138 
Shortly after learning of Teicher's and Frankel's alleged 
participation in a conspiracy to trade in securities while in the 
possession of material non public information, the Division be-
gan an investigation. 139 After two years of investigating, which 
concluded in 1988, Teicher and Frankel were indicted for these 
dealings. 140 
131 See id. 
132 S id ee . 
133 
See Respondent's Brief at 9. 
134 S id ee . at 8. 
135 
See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(aXI8). See supra note 128 and accompanying text for a 
definition similar to that of "a person associated with a broker or dealer." 
138 
See Respondent's Brief at 8. 
137 S id ee . 
138 S id ee . at9. 
139 
See Petitioners' Brief at 5·6. 
140 S 'd ee 1 • at 6. 
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IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
A. TEICHER'S AND FRANKEL'S CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS FOR 
PARTICIPATING IN AN INSIDER TRADING SCHEME 
613 
On April 6, 1990, a jury found both Teicher and 
Frankel guilty of numerous felonies. 141 Teicher's crimes 
included one count of conspiracy, nine counts of securities 
fraud, two counts of fraud in connection with a tender of-
fer, and two counts of mail fraud. 142 Teicher was subse-
quently sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment, placed on 
probation for five years, and fined $200,000. 143 Frankel's 
crimes included one count of conspiracy, one count of se-
curities fraud, one count of mail fraud, one count of per-
jury, and two counts of obstruction of justice. 144 Frankel 
was subsequently sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment 
and fined $10,000.145 Both Teicher's and Frankel's convic-
tions were affirmed on appeal. l46 
B. CIVIL ACTIONS BROUGHT AGAINST TEICHER AND FRANKEL 
SEEKING INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS 
While the criminal action was proceeding, the Division, 
seeking injunctive relief and disgorgement, brought civil 
actions against both Teicher and Frankel in 1991.147 The 
court entered judgment against Frankel, by consent, on 
May 18, 1994.148 In settlement, Frankel paid a disgorge-
141 See Respondent's Brief at 9. 
142 S id ee . 
143 S id ee . 
144 S id ee . 
145 S id ee . 
146 
See Respondent's Brief at 9 (citing United States v. Teicher, 987 F.2d 112 (2d 
Cir.), cerl. denied, 114 S. Ct. 467 (1993». 
147 See Petitioners' Brief at 4. 
148 
See Respondent's Brief at 10. 
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ment, prejudgment interest and penalty amount. 149 Ap-
proximately three years later, on December 11, 1997, the 
court entered judgment against Teicher, also by consent. ISO 
As a part of his settlement, Teicherl'l paid approximately 
$982,000 in disgorgement, prejudgment interest and pen-
alties. m He also agreed to be enjoined from violating Sec-
tions 10(b) and 14(e) of the Exchange Act. U3 
c. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING TO SANCTION TEICHER AND 
FRANKEL UNDER THE STATUTORY POWERS OF SECTIONS 
15(B)(6) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT AND 203(F) OF THE ADVISERS 
ACT 
In addition to the civil actions, the Division instituted 
an administrative proceeding on June 20, 1994, based on 
Teicher's and Frankel's criminal convictions.l~ In this 
proceeding, the Division sought, pursuant to Section 
203(e) and (0 of the Advisers Act and Sections 15(b) and 
19(h) of the Exchange Act, to bar Teicher and Frankel for 
life from the securities industry. I" On November 11, 
1994, as a partial settlement of this proceeding, Teicher 
consented to be barred permanently from associating with 
any broker-dealer, investment company, municipal secu-
rities dealer and registered investment adviser. 1'6 "He 
also agreed to be permanently barred from associating 
149 See id. Unlike in Teicher's case, the Commission relied on Frankel's perma-
nent injunction as a basis for bringing an administrative proceeding. See id. 
160 S id ee . 
161 Teicher, along with Teicher & Co. and Carmel Partners, L.P., participated in 
the settlement. See Petitioner's Brief at 6. 
162 S id ee . 
163 S id ee . 
164 See Respondent's Brief at 10. This administrative proceeding was the subject of 
Teicher's and Frankel's appeal and the subject of this Note. See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 
1016. 
166 • . . 
See Petitioners' Bnefat 7. 
166 S id ee . 
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with any unregistered investment adviser, but 'only if and 
when there [was] a final, unappealable order and only to 
the extent that such order determine[d] that the Commis-
sion ha[d] authority ... under Section 203(0 of the Advis-
ers Act . . . to impose such a sanction against [him].' "1S7 
On February 27, 1995, the ALJ barred Teicher from asso-
ciating with the entities as to which he had consented and 
barred him from associating with any unregistered m-
vestment adviser. ISS 
Frankel similarly consented to be barred from associ-
ating with any broker-dealer, investment company, or 
municipal securities dealer.1S9 However, he claimed that 
the Commission lacked authority to bar him from associ-
ating with an investment adviser because he had not been 
associated with an investment adviser during his wrong-
doing or during the Commission's proceeding. '60 Accord-
ingly, the ALJ ordered Frankel barred from associating 
with the various firms as to which he had consented, but 
did not bar him from associating with investment advis-
ers.161 
157 
Respondent's Brief at 10-11. 
158 
See id. at 11. See also Petitioner's Brief at 8, 10-11. Teicher noted that the ALJ 
made this finding notwithstanding the Court's decision in Wallach v. SEC, 202 F.2d 
462 (D.C. Cir. 1953), and notwithstanding the extensive legislative history clearly 
indicating that Congress had a contrary intent. In Wallach, the court examined an 
analogous provision of the Exchange Act whose language was virtually identical to the 
applicable provision of Section 203, and determined that Congress did not confer upon 
the SEC jurisdiction to regulate unregistered entities. See id. 
159 
See Respondent's Brief at 11. 
160 
See id. Frankel believed that the SEC could not use Section 203(0 to prevent 
him from associating with investment advisers unless he was associating or seeking to 
become associated with investment advisers. See id. 
161 See Petitioner's Memo at 3. The ALJ also held that this administrative pro-
ceeding did not provide Frankel with the requisite notice that a bar against associa-
tion with investment advisers would be sought. See id. 
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1. Teicher's and The Division of Enforcement's Appeal to The 
Commission from The Administrative Law Judge's Decision 
On March 10, 1995, Teicher appealed to the Commis-
sion from the ALJ's decision to bar him from associating 
with any unregistered adviser. 162 The Division. also ap-
pealed, based on the ALJ's decision not to bar Frankel 
from associating with any investment adviser. 163 On May 
20, 1998, the Commission affirmed in part and reversed 
in part the ALJ's ruling. IM 
In affirming the ALJ's decision, the Commission dis-
agreed with Teicher's argument that Section 203(f) 
authorized the SEC to take action only against persons 
associated with registered investment advisers and con-
cluded that, pursuant to the section's unambiguous lan-
guage defining "investment adviser" and "person associ-
ated with an inv~stment adviser," the SEC had the 
authority to discipline persons associated with both regis-
tered and unregistered advisers. 1M In reversing the ALJ's 
162 See Petitioner's Brief at 8. See also Respondent's Brief at 12. 
163 
See id. See also Petitioner's Memo at 3. While the Division's appeal in 
Frankel's case was pending, the Commission found that the "collateral bar" issue 
under Section 15(b)(6) in another pending Commission case, In the Matter of Meyer 
Blinder, 65 S.E.C. 1378 (1997). In Blinder the Commission, by a divided vote, held 
that the portion of Section 15(b)(6) which authorizes the Commission "to place limita-
tions on the activities or functions" of a broker-dealer should be interpreted to 
authorize the Commission to bar a person associated with a broker-dealer from asso-
ciation with entities regulated under all other securities statutes, for example, to 
authorize the imposition of an industry wide bar. Commissioner Hunt, in dissent, 
found that Section 15(b)(6) provides for a sliding scale of sanctions and observed that 
the second sanction of "plac[ing] limitations" could not be read to authorize collateral 
bars without doing violence to the plain meaning of the statute. Hunt noted that the 
Commission was seeking to read the "place limitations" language as having the same 
meaning as that of the word "bar" elsewhere in the statute. See id. at 3-4. 
164 
See Respondent's Brief at 12-14. 
165 
See id. at 12. It also stated that Section 203(0 authorized the Commission to 
take disciplinary action against any person associated with "an investment adviser" 
without limitation. Furthermore, the Commission concluded that, in light of the "ex-
tremely serious misconduct in which Teicher engaged," public interest required that 
he be barred from associating with any unregistered investment adviser, as well as 
24
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ruling, however, the Commission agreed with the Division 
that, following its decision in Blinder,l66 the SEC had the 
authority under Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act to 
collaterally bar Frankel from associating with an invest-
ment adviser or any other industry .167 
2. Teicher's and Frankel's Appeal to The District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals 
On June 22, 1998, Teicher and Frankel appealed the 
Commission's final order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit. l68 For the same reasons 
he advanced before the ALJ, Teicher once again argued 
that the Commission exceeded its authority to bar him 
from associating with an investment adviser because the 
term "investment adviser" in Section 203(0 of the Advis-
from associating with the other types of securities firms from which he had consented 
to be barred. Id. 
166 
See supra note 163 and accompanying text for discussion of Blinder. In 
Blinder, the Commission concluded that both the relevant legislative history and the 
purposes of the securities laws, including investor protection and regulatory efficiency, 
demonstrated Congress' intent that the provisions of Section 15(bX6) allowing the 
Commission to place limitations on the activities of a person associated with a broker-
dealer authorized the Commission to impose a collateral bar from Meyer's association 
with an investment adviser. See id. 
167 
See Respondent's Brief at 13. The Commission found in the present case that, 
in determining whether to impose a collateral bar on Frankel, it considered "whether 
the misconduct is of the type that, by its nature, 'flows across' various securities pro-
fessions and poses a risk of harm to the investing public in any such profession," and 
"whether the egregiousness of the misconduct shows the need for such a bar in order 
to protect the public." Moreover, the Commission found that "Frankel's egregious 
misconduct demonstrated ethical lapses that disqualittied] him from assuming any 
post involving fiduciary responsibilities," and that the public interest required that he 
be barred from associating with an investment adviser. Id. 
168 
See Petitioners' Brief at 1. See also ~etitioner's Memo at 4 n.2. Frankel filed 
his petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit under 15 
U.S.C. § 78y(aX1). The Commission moved in that Court for transfer of Frankel's 
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) because of the appeal of petitioners Victor Teicher and Victor 
Teicher & Company, L.P. Ignoring the fact that the Commission had entered separate 
and distinct orders for Frankel and for the Teicher petitions, the Second Circuit trans-
ferred the Frankel appeal so that it may be consolidated. See id. 
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ers Act was limited to registered investment advisers.l69 
Following this logic, because Teicher was associated with 
an investment adviser that was exempt from registration, 
he could not be sanctioned under Section 203(0. 170 
Frankel, in his appeal, argued that, contrary to Blinder, 
the "place limitations" language in Section 15(b)(6) of the 
Exchange Act, which the SEC had used to bar him from 
associating with an investment adviser, allowed the 
Commission to bar a person associated with a broker-
dealer only from associating with another broker-dealer, 
not another entity.171 
v. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit heard Teicher v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion172 on April 30, 1999 and handed down its decision on 
June 1, 1999.173 The court commenced its analysis of 
Teicher by introducing petitioners Teicher and Frankel, 
briefly discussing their insider trading crimes and de-
scribing the procedural posture of the case. 174 After stat-
ing the issue as whether the portions of the SEC's final 
order barring petitioners from associating with any in-
vestment adviser was "beyond the Commission's author-
169 
See Respondent's Brief at 4. 
170 
See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1017-18. 
171 
See ill. at 5. 
172 
177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
173 
See id. Circuit Judge Williams authored the opinion deciding this case, which 
was heard by himself along with Circuit Judges Silberman and Tate!. See id. at 1017. 
174 
See id. at 1017. As already explained in the Facts and Procedural History por-
tions of this note, the court proceeded by stating that Petitioners Teicher and Frankel 
were convicted of various charges of securities fraud, conspiracy and mail fraud for 
their participation in an insider trading scheme. Thereafter, in a later administrative 
proceeding, the SEC issued an order barring both petitioners from various branches of 
the securities industry, specifically, association with registered and unregistered in-
vestment advisers. See ill. 
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ity," the court proceeded to address each of Teicher's and 
Frankel's claims. 17s 
A. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
REJECTS THE MERITS OF TEICHER'S CLAIM 
The court made several findings in response to 
Teicher's claim that the term "investment adviser" cov-
ered only registered ones. These findings specifically re-
fute Teicher's claim that the SEC lacks authority under 
Section 203(0 to sanction him because he was not associ-
ated with a registered investment adviser at the time of 
his wrongdoing or at the time of the Commission's ad-
ministrative proceeding. 176 The court found, first, that the 
language in Section 203(0 was not limited to "registered" 
investment advisers. In In support of this finding, the 
court noted that "the [Advisers] Act explicitly defines an 
investment adviser as 'any person who, for compensation, 
engages in the business of advising others [without any 
mention of registration] as to the advisability of investing 
in, purchasing, or selling securities.' "178 The court further 
supported its finding by reasoning that since the term 
"registered" is specified in various places in the Advisers 
Act, it is logical to assume that when the Advisers Act 
uses the unmodified term "investment adviser," it means 
both registered and unregistered. 179 
In its second finding, the court distinguished its earlier 
decision in Wallach v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
175 See id. at 1017. 
176 See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1017-18. 
177 S id 0 ee .1 18. 
178 [d. (alteration in original)(citing §202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §80b-
2(a)(11». 
179 . 
See id. at 1017. The court noted a8 examples §§ 203(d) and 208, 15 U.S.C. 
§§80b-3(d) and 80b-8; and §§ 204 and 205, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-4 and 80b-5 which exempt 
advisers from registration. See id. at 1018. 
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sion l80 from Teicher's situation. In Wallach, the D.C. Cir-
cuit court construed the phrase "any broker dealer" in the 
Exchange Act to mean only "registered" broker-dealers. 181 
Teicher insisted that the analogous provision of Section 
203(0 in the Advisers Act should be similarly construed. 182 
The court, however, disagreed. 183 The statute at issue in 
Wallach dealt only with the denial or revocation of regis-
tration as a broker-dealer; the case was therefore limited 
to a person seeking or already holding a registration. l84 
Teicher, on the other hand, was neither registered nor 
seeking to become SO.18S The court thus narrowed Wal-
lach's holding by limiting it to its facts and found that 
Wallach was inapposite to Teicher's claim. l86 
Third, the court found inconclusive Teicher's argument 
. that Section 203, as originally enacted in 1940, applied 
only to registered investment advisers. 187 The court's per-
spective stems from the fact that "since 1940 Congress 
has amended the Advisers Act and expanded the array of 
sanctions far beyond the early focus on registration. "188 
This has resulted in Section 203 no longer applying solely 
to registered investment advisers. 189 At "present, "the 
180 
202 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1953). 
181 
See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1018-19. 
182 See id. at 1018. 
183 See id. 
184 S id ee . 
185 S id ee . 
186 See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1018. In Wallach, the SEC tried to force the joinder of 
a broker-dealer's employee-salesman as a party in disciplinary proceedings against the 
broker-dealer. The Wallach court rejected the SEC's argument that the statute, which 
focused on broker-dealers, would apply to their employees. See id. 
187 See id. In 1940, Section 203 originally provided only for the denial, revocation 
or suspension of a registration as an investment adviser. At that time, to be sanc-
tioned the investment adviser must have been registered. Thus, Section 203 must 
have only applied to registered investment advisers. See id. 
188 [d. 
189 See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1018. 
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SEC's sanction power - even looking only at that granted 
by Section 203(0 - explicitly covers persons merely asso-
ciated with or seeking association with investment advis-
ers and ranges from censure to an outright ban on asso-
ciation with an investment adviser."'90 Thus, because of 
the expansion in sanctions since Section 203's enactment, 
the court held that unregistered investment advisers, as 
well as those associated with them, fall within the SEC's 
jurisdiction. 191 
In its fourth finding, the court rejected Teicher's argu-
ment that a statement from the 1970 amendments, which 
created Section 203(0, indicated that the section was in-
tended to cover only "registered" investment advisers and 
that the statement suggested that Section 203(0 should 
parallel Section 15(b)'s sanctioning provision under the 
Exchange Act. '92 The court explained that "such a use of 
the adjective 'registered' in a Senate report [wa]s not of 
much help, especially when the statute itself offer[ed] no 
apparent ambiguity."'93 Moreover, the SEC "point[ed] to 
references in the same Senate report that describe[d] the 
addition [of Section 203(0] with no mention of 'registered.' 
"194 Thus, Teicher's reference to the Senate report did not 
establish a clear intent by Congress to limit Section 203(0 
to registered investment advisers alone. '9s Nor did the 
court find Teicher's references to several other items of 
legislative history, not pertaining to the enactment of Sec-
tion 203, any more persuasive. '96 
190 ld. 
191 S id ee . 
192 S id ee . 
193 ld. (citing Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994». 
194 Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1019. 
195 S id ee . 
196 See id. 
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Finally, after reviewing the Commission's statutory in-
terpretation under the principles of Chevron,l97 the court 
found that "Teicher ha[d] not effectively challenged the 
Commission's reading of the [Advisers] Act's unambigu-
ous language. "198 The court made clear that even if the Act 
was to be found ambiguous, under Chevron, the SEC's in-
terpretation of it was reasonable and had been correctly 
accorded deference by the lower COurtS. I99 
B. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
APPROVES THE MERITS OF FRANKEL'S CLAIM 
The court similarly made several findings in response to 
Frankel's claim that Section 15(b)(6) of the Exchange Act, 
which is triggered by a person's past, present or future associa-
tion with a broker-dealer, did not supply the Commission with 
the authority to exclude persons from the investment adviser 
industry.2oo Frankel made two primary assertions with respect 
to his claim: first, that the term "limitation" and the term "bar" 
are different and second, that if the two terms could be used 
interchangeably under Section 15(b)(6), Congress would not 
have provided the progression of penalties. 201 With both asser-
tions, Frankel essentially argued that the SEC's interpretation 
"flout[ed] the [statutory] progression."202 
First and foremost, the court noted that it need not decide 
whether Frankel's assertions were correct because it found 
that the SEC's interpretation of Section 15(b)(6) suffered from 
"fatal structural difficulties."203 In support of its finding, the 
court reasoned that the "place limitations" language required 
197 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See supra notes 110-123 and accompanying text for facts 
and rules from Chevron. 
198 
Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1019. 
199 See id. at 1018-19. 
200 
See id. at 1017. 
201 . 
See id. at 1019. 
202 [d. 
203 
Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1019. 
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some concept of "relevant domain. "204 For example, a relevant 
domain exists where the context in which the statutory lan-
guage is placed coincides with the meaning of the statutory 
language. 20S The Commission's reading of the "place limita-
tions" language, however, did not fit the context in which Con-
gress had placed the language.206 The court interpreted that 
"the context - a rather elaborate structure of separate provi-
sions with distinct threshold requirements - suggest[ed] that 
Congress meant the SEC would make those threshold finding 
before administering the corresponding sanctions. "207 Thus, the 
Commission should have considered the context in which Con-
gress created the phrase "place limitations" when it evaluated 
the phrase's significance and meaning.208 As a result, Frankel's 
claim initially won the court's approval merely on the SEC's 
unbounded interpretation. 
Frankel's claim secured the court's approval when the court 
found that the SEC's expanded interpretation of the "place 
limitations" language was unreasonably broad. The SEC pos-
ited that once a threshold requirement of "association" is satis-
fied, it should be able to use the "place limitations" language to 
move freely from one licensing regime to another. 209 The court 
disagreed, finding a threshold nexus requirement under each 
. sanctioning provision of each Act.210 In discussing the nexus 
requirement, the court observed three systems of occupational 
licensing to be administered by the SEC: investment advisers 
and their associated persons, as regulated under the Advisers 
Act; broker-dealers and their associated persons, as regulated 
under the Exchange Act; and municipal securities dealers and 
204 ld. 
205 
See ill. at 1021 (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995». 
206 See ill. at 1021. 
207 ld. 
20B 
See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1019. In concluding its point, the court mockingly 
commented that, "even the Commission d[id not] suggest that the phrase allows it to 
bar one of the offending parties from being a retail shoe salesman, or to exclude him 
from the Borough of Manhattan." ld. 
209 . 
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their associated persons, also governed by the Exchange Act.211 
"In each regime," the court explained, "there is, as to associ-
ated persons, an almost identically worded threshold nexus 
requirement."212 Using Frankel's situation as an example, the 
court observed that the Commission sanctioned Frankel under 
Section 15(b)(6), which applied "to any person who is associ-
ated, who is seeking to become associated, or at the time of the 
alleged misconduct, who was associated or was seeking to be-
come associated with a broker-dealer."213 The nexus was thus 
an "association" within a specific licensing industry. The court 
then noted that the section under which Teicher was sanc-
tioned required a similar nexus, but to investment advisers.214 
Likewise, the provision for municipal securities dealers "fol-
low[ed] precisely the structure of the investment adviser provi-
sion" and thus required a nexus to municipal securities deal-
ers.m 
With this nexus requirement in mind, the court discussed 
the origins and history of the SEC's self-bestowed power to im-
pose "collateral bars" as sanctions under Section 15(b)(6) of the 
Exchange Act.216 The court focused on the most recent admin-
istrative proceeding, In the Matter of Meyer Blinder/I? where 
the Commission relied on "a general principle favoring 'flexible' 
construction of the securities laws to effectuate their remedial 
purposes," 218 in resolutely initiating its claim to effect a "collat-
eral bar."219 In reference to Blinder, the court addressed three 
points made by the SEC: first, that the "collateral bar" concept 
enables the SEC to do in one proceeding what would otherwise 









216 See id. at 1019. 
217 
65 S.E.C. 1378 (1997). 
218 
1d. (citing Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1381 (citing Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. 
First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185-86 (1994»). 
219 
See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1019. 
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of a regulatory "gap" or loophole through which a securities 
law violator could, for a period of time, participate in the secu-
rities industry without the knowledge of the Commission; and 
third, that the legislative history of a subsequent provision 
shows that the Commission's reading of the statute is on point 
with congressional intent.220 
Addressing the SEC's first objection that it would be forced 
to do in two proceedings what would otherwise be more con-
venient to do in one, the court did not find "especially vexing" 
the SEC's objection that the SEC must wait, perhaps an in-
definite amount of time before obtaining a securities law viola-
tor within its jurisdiction to deny registration.221 Furthermore, 
the court concluded that the statutes at issue "simply do not 
permit the Commission to impose sanctions in any specific 
branch until it can show the nexus matching that branch. "222 
"Congress's thrice repeated use of a nexus requirement [each 
centered] on a single branch of the [securities] industry [un-
derscores] a congressional determination to create separate 
sets of sanctions, each triggered by an individual's satisfying 
the industry-specific nexus. "223 The court, thus concluded that 
its own interpretation "seem[ed] entirely consonant with Con-
gress's [act of establishing] three separate systems for denying 
the benefits of 'association' with licensed entities in the several 
systems. "224 
Second, the court addressed the Commission's point re-
garding the regulatory gap. While the court acknowledged the 
SEC's concern that "a branch-by-branch reading of the stat-
utes" would create a risk to investors and that the SEC would 
receive no notice to initiate a proceeding if Frankel sought to 
associate with an unregistered investment advisor, the court 
presumed that Congress must have meant for the gap to 
220 See id. See also Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1381-83. 
221 See id. The SEC has the power to ultimately deny registration under Commis-
sion's Rule of Practice 193. See Respondent's Brief at 39. 
222 Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1020. 
223 1d. 
224 
1d. at 1020-21. 
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exist.225 Such a loophole may have been allowed by Congress to 
curtail the SEC's jurisdiction so that such concerns could be 
left to the states.226 The court made clear, however, that, "a 
congressional discount of peril is hardly the strongest argu-
ment why [it] should see [the gap] as urgent."227 Thus, the 
regulatory gap argument was unpersuasive in rationalizing the 
existence of a collateral bar. 
Third, in determining the need for a collateral bar, the court 
examined the legislative history of the 1987 amendments, 
which the SEC set forth in support of its final point.228 Specifi-
cally, the SEC asserted that the 1987 amendments added the 
"place limitations" language to the sanctioning provision for 
municipal securities dealers, and, therefore, made the provi-
sion parallel to that of the investment advisers' and broker-
dealers' sanctioning provisions.229 The court recognized that 
the Senate report accompanying the change in the 1987 
amendments discussed what the "place limitations" language 
was meant to cover, but did not agree with the SEC's interpre-
tations of what that was. 230 The SEC argued that the Senate 
report offered choices of sanctions indisputably added by in-
serting the "place limitations" language and that the passage 
appeared to conform to the Commission's understanding.231 
The SEC also argued that, although the Senate report was a 
225 
[d. at 1021. 
226 
See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1021. The court confidently stated, "assuming the 
Commission cannot remedy [the gap] by an equivalent notice provision for such advis-
ers, that gap can only be because Congress withheld the authority - presumably for 
good reason, perhaps relating to [the SEC's] limited scale or regulation by other juris-
dictions." [d. 
227 [d. 




See Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1021. The report read: 
[T]he Commission regards this as a desirable change in the law be-
cause the limitations authority is an important recognition by Con-
gress of the need for flexibility to fashion sanctions that fit the offense 
and situation presented. For example, the Commission may use its 
'limitations' authority ... to bar persons formerly associated with bro-
ker-dealers from entering other securities professions where they 
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post-enactment type of legislative history, which purportedly 
described an earlier enactment or a parallel provision, it was 
relevant in establishing ambiguity in the phrase commented 
upon.232 The court dismissed all of this, however, by stating, 
"at most, then, all the legislative history can do is to buttress 
the Commission's claim that the 'place limitations' language is 
ambiguous, and [that] its interpretation is entitled to Chevron 
deference if it is reasonable and consistent with statutory pur-
pose."233 The court then concluded that even if it accepts the 
assumption of ambiguity, Chevron's criterion of reasonableness 
was not satisfied.234 
While reviewing Blinder and restating that the individual 
threshold requirement must be met under each Act, the court 
further noted that neither in its brief nor in Blinder did the 
SEC ever articulate an explicit limiting principle other than 
that of barring the offender from engaging in "activities in 
other securities professions. "235 The court suggested that "such 
a [broad principle], if lawful, would allow the Commission to 
bar Frankel from becoming a commercial banker or a mergers-
and-acquisitions attorney, activities linked to the securities 
industry but not under the Commission's jurisdiction. "236 The 
court, however, acknowledged that because the Commission 
set forth a regulatory "gap" claim, the SEC was only seriously 
claiming that the "place limitations" power enabled it to bar an 
offender from a branch of the securities industry from which it 
might later have had explicit authority to exclude him.237 Nev-
ertheless, under this reading, the court still found that the 
SEC's holding "contradicted the way in which Congress has 
232 See id. at 1021 (citing McCreary v. Offner, 172 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1999); but c£ 
United States ex reo Long. V. SCS Business & Technical Institute, Inc., 173 F.3d 870 
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (declaring post-enactment legislative history as having "only mar-
ginal, if any, value"». 
233 
Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1021 (citing Troy Corp. V. Browner, 120 F. 3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 




See id. at 1019 (citing Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1383). 
236 Teicher, 177 F.3d at 1020. 
237 
See id. at 1020. 
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structured the relevant occupational license regimes and re-
lated sanctions. "238 
In conclusion, the court affirmed the SEC's order barring 
Teicher from associating with any investment adviser, regis-
tered or unregistered, but found the order barring Frankel 
from associating with an investment adviser in excess of the 
Commission's sanctioning powers. 239 
VI. CRITIQUE 
A. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 
BLINDLY FAVORED THE SEC's JURISDICTION OVER 
UNREGISTERED INVESTMENT ADVISORS To TEICHER'S 
DETRIMENT 
During its discussion of Teicher's claim, the court essen-
tially found that whenever the Advisers Act specifies "regis-
tered," it applies solely to registered investment advisers; 
where the Advisers Act is silent on registration, however, the 
Act applies to all investment advisers, registered and unregis-
tered. This is a valid conclusion if all other interpretations 
have been ruled out. The court, however, does not support its 
interpretation with evidence of Congress' intent, or lack 
thereof. The court should have first thoroughly addressed 
Congress' intent for incorporating or eliminating the term 
"registered" within the Advisers Act. If Congress intended the 
absence of the word "registered" to mean that the provision 
applied to all investment advisers, the court's interpretation 
would have been correct. Only after it found that Congress 
was silent or ambiguous on the issue, could the court, accord-
ing to Chevron, affirm the SEC's interpretation. The interpre-
tation, of course, must also be reasonable. 
Sources such as the Report of the Task Force on SEC Set-
tlements of the Subcommittee on Civil Litigation and SEC En-
238 [d. 
239 
See id. at 1021-22. 
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forcement Matters of the Federal Securities Law Committee of 
the American Bar Association Section of Business Law,240 sug-
gest that the court may have taken the wrong position in up-
holding the SEC's interpretation. In so concluding, the Task 
Force noted that: 
The SEC has taken the position that it has the author-
ity, under Section 203(0 of the Advisers Act, to bar in-
dividuals from associating with any investment adviser, 
including an adviser whose activities do not require it to 
register under Section 203. This position, however, is 
not supported by the legislative history of the Advisers 
Act. The plain language and structure of Section 203, 
the legislative history, and certain of the SEC's own 
statements in proposing and adopting Rule 29 of its 
Rules of Practice,I24IJ all lead to the conclusion that the 
SEC does not have the [administrative] power to bar an 
individual from [associating] with an investment ad-
viser that is not required to register under Section 
203.242 
Thus, according to the Task Force, the court's position on 
Teicher's matter is incorrect. 
The court may have confused its reasoning by accepting the 
Commission's logic without scrutinizing the Commission's ar-
gument. For instance, when the court discussed the expansion 
of the possible sanctions since 1940,243 the court could not have 
realistically been stating that the extension equals the ability 
to sanction unregistered investment advisers and those associ-
ated with them. An expansion of sanctions does not equal an 
expansion of jurisdiction. Had the court scrutinized the Com-
240 . 
Harvey L. Pitt, Report of the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47 BuS LAw 1083, 
1085 (1992) [hereinafter Pitt, Report of the Task Force]. 
241 
The Commission's Rule of Practice 29, which is now Rule 193, 17 CFR 201.29, 
"applies to applications by persons who have previously been barred by the Commis· 
sion from association with registered entities to become so associated." Respondent's 
Brief at 39 n.40. 
242 Pitt, Report of the Task Force, supra note 240, at 1085 (emphasis in original). 
:us See supra notes 187·191 and accompanying text. 
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mission's logic, it should have noted this legal inconsistency. 
Moreover, "anyone" can associate, even an unregistered in-
vestment adviser; it is with whom one associate's that triggers 
the sanction. Thus, Teicher legitimately argued that unregis-
tered investment advisers or their associates are not automati-
cally within the SEC's jurisdiction solely because the range of 
sanctions has expanded to include those who merely associate. 
Only those associating with register investment advisers, and 
the registered investment advisers themselves, are logically 
within the SEC's jurisdiction. Therefore, because the original 
sanction was meant only to apply to registered investment ad-
visers, the court improperly linked the SEC's ability to sanc-
tion anyone who is or associates with aD. investment adviser 
and the ability to sanction anyone who is or associates with an 
unregistered investment adviser. 
Additionally, the court gave too much weight to the Senate 
report from the 1970 Amendments, which added Section 203(0. 
In the Senate report, the term "registered" appeared inconsis-
tently throughout the report, thus modifying some provisions 
and not others. This inconsistency should not result in the 
strict meaning that all of Section 203(0 applied to both regis-
tered and unregistered investment advisers. According to the 
court's own logic, when the term "registered" appears in a pro-
vision, that provision applies only to registered investment ad-
visers because the term "registered" is specified. Conversely, 
when a provision does not use the term "registered," the court 
reads that provision as covering both registered and unregis-
tered investment advisers. The court found this interpretation 
not ambiguous in any respect.244 The court, however, failed to 
use its own logic when reading the Senate report and holding it 
to be ambiguous. If it had, it would have realized that the 
Senate report covered registered investment advisers when it 
said "registered" and both registered and unregistered when it 
did not. Thus, the report would have been clear. Neverthe-
less, the court ultimately disregarded the report, deeming it 
unnecessary for interpreting "an otherwise clear statute." 
244 • 
See Teu:her, 177 F.3d at 1019. 
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B. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCllT COURT OF APPEALS DID 
NOT CORRECTLY APPLY CHEVRON BECAUSE No BENCHMARK 
FOR REAsONABLENESS EXISTED AS TO THE COLLATERAL BAR 
In reviewing Frankel's claim, the court need not have 
drawn such a absurd comparison when it stated "even the 
Commission doesn't suggest that the 'place limitations' phrase 
allows it to bar one of the offending parties from being a retail 
shoe salesman" in order to make its point.24s This interpreta-
tion is obviously one that the SEC would not have reached. 
The central issue was whether the SEC's construction of the 
"place limitation" language was reasonable, not whether the 
SEC would agree to the fact that a reasonable interpretation of 
the language must be evaluated within a relevant domain. 
Nevertheless, how the SEC arrived at its interpretation was a 
factor in the court's determination of the SEC's reasonable-
ness. 
The court also made an unfair comment in stating that the 
SEC lacked an "explicit limiting principle other than the idea 
of a bar of the offender from engaging in 'activities in other 
securities professions.' "246 In Blinder, the SEC made clear that 
the "place limitations" provision "[would] not make superfluous 
the authority to suspend or bar a person from association with 
a broker-dealer."247 The SEC emphasized that it was deter-
mined to use the "collateral bar" remedy on a case-by-case ba-
sis and only for sufficiently egregious conduct.248 In addition, 
the SEC explained that in some cases, it would determine not 
to impose a collateral bar at all, but rather use provisions 
authorizing it to consider a subsequent request to reenter the 
securities industry in another capacity.249 
In support of its case-by-case approach, the Commission ar-
ticulated criteria for imposing a collateral bar, which may be 
245 S id ee . 
246 Id. 
247 Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1384. 
248 See supra notes 71-106 and accompanying text. 
249 See Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1384. 
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viewed not only as a limiting principle, but as guide.2S0 In de-
termining whether to impose a collateral bar, the SEC indi-
cated that it would consider whether an act of misconduct is of 
the sort that, by its nature, "flows across various securities 
professions and poses a risk of harm to the investing public in 
any such profession. "251 The Commission would also consider 
whether "the egregiousness of the respondent's misconduct 
demonstrates the need for a comprehensive response in order 
to protect the public. "252 Although to the court this criteria may 
not be a sufficiently "explicit" limiting principle for the SEC's 
imposition of collateral bars, the SEC recognized that it may 
only impose a collateral bar "where warranted." This suggests 
that the SEC recognized that it would be improper to impose 
such a remedy arbitrarily. 2$3 
In continuing to denounce the Commission's use of collat-
eral bars, the court presented another extreme scenario by 
suggesting that if the court followed the Commission's inter-
pretation of the "place limitations" language, the Commission 
could then bar Frankel from becoming a commercial banker or 
a mergers-and-acquisitions attorney, activities outside the 
Commission's jurisdiction.234 However, not all activities linked 
to the securities industry could reasonably be admitted under 
the Commission's jurisdiction. Most, if not all, of the Commis-
sion's sanctions dealing with imposing a collateral bar have 
been confined to barring the defendant from associating with 
broker-dealers, investment advisers and municipal securities 
250 • 
See Te,cher, 177 F.3d at 1019. 
251 Id. See also Blinder, 65 S.E.C. at 1379. 
252 See Anne E. Chafer et aI., 1997 In Review: Opinions Issued by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission Resolving Administrative Appeals, 1038 PLJlCoRP 7 (1998). 
See also Annual Review, supra note 92, at 930. In other words, the SEC placed limita-
tions on its power to impose such a collateral bar by noting that it would be justified 
only in cases in which "it [would be] contrary to the public interest to allow someone to 
serve in any capacity in the securities industry, as where such conduct 'flows across' 
various securities professions and poses a risk of harm to the investing public in any 
such profession." Id. In addition, the SEC held that it would consider whether the 
defendant's conduct was egregious enough to justify limited the defendant's conduct 
across·the securities industry generally. See id. 
253 
See Respondent's Brief at 45. 
254 • 
See Te,cher, 117 F.3d at 1020. 
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dealers, which are licensed entities falling under the Exchange 
and Advisers Acts. ~s 
On a more supportive note, the court made a valid point in 
stating that to give the SEC an industry-wide sanctioning 
power under one Act negates any reason for a "thrice repeated 
use of a nexus requirement." In other words, no reason exists 
for three separate rules if Congress had intended that one ap-
ply to all. The only logical conclusion from observing the way 
Congress structured the three regimes is that each one has its 
own requirements and respective sanctions, which may be ap-
plied only in their respective securities industries. This was 
Frankel's strongest point and tipped the scale in his favor. 
The court, however, did not rely on this point because it was 
already convinced that Congress must have intended to create 
a regulatory gap, a problem of concern to the SEC. At this 
point in its opinion, the court headed downward when it con-
cluded that a threshold nexus requirement exists under each 
Act, but presented no tangible evidence to support this inter-
pretation. This non-existent evidence, however, was sufficient 
to rebut the SEC's evidence of the Act's purpose and its stan-
dard of decisionmaking, all of which supported the Commis-
sion's concern regarding the regulatory loophole and the need 
to fill it with a "collateral bar." The court's lack of evidence 
also overpowered the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron, 
which required the court to defer to an agency's reasonable 
interpretation. The court, here, probably refused to defer to 
the SEC's interpretation on the basis that it did not find the 
SEC's interpretation "reasonable enough," even though its own 
interpretation may not be any more reasonable than the 
SEC's. 
Unsupported reasoning was not the only flaw in the court's 
analysis. The court's comment that "a congressional discount 
of peril is hardly the strongest argument" for why it should 
view both the Commission's concern about the risk to investors 
and its inability to reach securities laws violators who associ-
266 
See Respondent's Brief at 31-32. 
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ate with unregistered investment advisers as urgent, is not a 
sound standard for precedent in this area of the law. The 
whole purpose for creating the SEC was to regulate the securi-
ties markets and protect the investing public.2S6 To discount 
this peril thwarts the purposes of the Acts. The court should 
not have been so confident in believing that Congress inten-
tionally created the regulatory gap. Congress may have 
merely overlooked such a risk when drafting the Act,2.57 or 
maybe even intended that the SEC fill the gap. Thus, the 
court's claim that its reading is the only explanation for the 
regulatory gap is questionable. The SEC's interpretation on 
the other hand takes Congress' imperfection into account and 
makes a reasonable interpretation in the best interest of the 
public. 
The court's analysis is most damaged, however, when the 
Senate report introduced by the SEC explicitly mentions the 
purpose for the "place limitations" language in the municipal 
securities dealers sanctioning provision, which is essentially 
identical to the provision at issue. It is true that it does not 
make sense that Congress would create three similar provi-
sions under two different acts covering three different licenses 
if it meant for one provision to give the SEC the power to sanc-
tion solely under that one provision. However, it is also true 
that it does not make sense that Congress would explain the 
reason for the "place limitations" language under one provision 
of one Act2.58 and not explain the reason for the "place limita-
tions" language in the provision at issue. The court should ei-
ther follow that which is explicit, rather than implicit, or it 
should view these two conflicting arguments as creating ambi-
guity for Chevron purposes. 
256 See SKOUSEN, supra note 3, at 1. See also supra notes 8-123 and accompanying 
text for background on the SEC. 
257 
This could be a possibility, especially in light of other ambiguous areas in the 
past having been addressed later on by amendments and newly created Acts correct-
ing or clarifying those areas. See generally Respondent's Brief. 
258 This is referring to the Senate report discussing the 1987 Amendments, which 
does give the SEC the power to impose a bar from any securities profession if a securi-
ties dealer violates the law. See supra notes 172-239 and accompanying text. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Apart from the language of the statutes themselves, little 
guidance exists in the Exchange and Advisers Acts, or even in 
court or SEC decisions, about what constitutes a sufficient 
sanction for a particular kind of conduct.259 The Commission 
has, until this case, confidently relied on its own interpretation 
of the Acts to address enforcement concerns and pursue viola-
tions. For instance, as a part of following the sanctioning pro-
vision requirements of the Exchange and Advisers Acts, the 
Commission must affirmatively determine that a particular 
sanction is "in the public interest." This, however, may be dif-
ficult to do in contested cases, such as Teicher, where the 
meaning of "in the public interest" is rarely specified.260 From 
the court's perspective, the Commission may be using its pub-
lic interest guide to read its statutory authority too broadly, 
perhaps to its own detriment. 
The purpose of this note in analyzing Teicher v. Securities 
and Exchange Commission was to bring to light the issue of 
the Commission's power to sanction and two of the various 
problems that may be encountered as a result of its enforce-
ment authority. As a consequence of this case, the results of 
prior SEC administrative orders may be revisited.261 Thus, 
persons or entities, who previously have agreed to sanctions 
precluding them from associating with certain securities in-
dustries, as in Frankel's case, but whose underlying conduct 
was not challenged through an administrative proceeding, may 
decide to apply for removal of their suspensions or bars on the 
ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction.262 Moreover, 
until a contrary decision is issued, those prohibited from asso-
ciating with investment advisers, as in Teicher's case, will 
probably avoid enforcement repercussions if they interpret 
259 




See Pitt, SEC Suspensions and Bars, supra note 79, at 267. 
262 S id ee . 
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their prohibition to include associations with unregistered, as 
well as registered, investment advisers.263 
A contrary decision mayor may not be issued from the Su-
preme Court as a result of Teicher filing for petition for certio-
rari on November 3, 1999.264 Among the issues brought to light 
by the brief, the most important one deals with the SEC's uni-
lateral determination that it had jurisdiction over Teicher. 265 
Essentially, Teicher's brief asserted that Chevron's deference 
standard should not have been applied to his case because the 
SEC had decided the scope of its own jurisdiction, an issue yet 
to be resolved by the Court in a pending case.266 The outcome of 
this petition is yet to be decided by the Court. 
Rose Arceo 
263 See id. 
264 See Petition For Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, Petitioners at 28, Teicher v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 177 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (No. 98-1287, Consolidated with 98-1414) 
(filed Nov. 3, 1999) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari). 
265 See Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 23-24. 
266 
See id. See also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FDA, 153 F.3d 155, cerl. 
granted, 119 S.Ct. 1495 (1999) . 
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